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PRIVATIZATION AND PUNISHMENT IN THE NEW AGE OF
REPROGENETICS
Dorothy E. Roberts*
INTRODUCTION
My scholarship on reproduction has made me acutely aware of the
stratification of childbearing in the United States.1 In particular, the social
value placed on a woman’s reproduction depends on her standing within the
hierarchies of race, class, and other inequitable divisions. My research
highlights the harsh dichotomy where policies punish poor black women for
bearing children but advanced technologies assist mainly affluent white
women not only to have genetically-related children, but to have children with
preferred genetic qualities.2 In this regard, I have worked with organizations
opposing a program offering substance-abusing women in minority
neighborhoods money to be sterilized3 and attended many fancy conferences
where academics debate precisely which traits are acceptable to select for
when testing an array of embryos for implantation.4 While welfare reform
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; faculty fellow, Institute for
Policy Research. I presented earlier versions of this article at the Emory Law Journal Thrower Symposium
and at the Radcliffe Center for Advanced Studies, University of Wisconsin, University of Maryland School of
Law, and UCLA Law School, and am grateful to participants for their comments. I also thank Haile Arrindell
and Monica Hunt for excellent research assistance and the Kirkland & Ellis Fund for research support.
1 See RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN
AMERICA (1999) (discussing the stratification of reproduction in the context of prenatal testing); Shellee
Colen, “Like a Mother to Them”: Stratified Reproduction and West Indian Childcare Workers and Employers
in New York, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 78, 78 (Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995)
(arguing that “physical and social reproductive tasks are accomplished differentially according to inequalities
that are based on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, place in a global economy, and migration status
and that are structured by social, economic, and political forces”).
2 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New
Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935 (1996).
3 See generally, e.g., Bid to Sterilize Drug Addicts Is Opposed by Calif. Activists, WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
1999, at A15; Suzanne Herel, Woman Who Pays Addicts Not to Conceive Is Welcomed, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1,
2001, at A13; Lynn Paltrow, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Treatment, Not Sterilization, Is the Way to
Help Addicted Moms (2000), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/oped.htm.
4 See, e.g., Gamal I. Serour, Dir., Int’l Islamic Ctr. for Population Studies and Res., Al-Azhar Univ.,
Egypt, Ethical Guidelines for Gender Selection: Are They Needed?, Address at the University of Michigan’s
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laws aim to deter women receiving public assistance from having even one
additional healthy baby,5 largely unregulated fertility clinics regularly implant
privileged women with multiple embryos, knowing the high risk multiple
births pose for premature delivery and low birth weight.6 The public
begrudges poor mothers a meager increase in benefits for one more child, but
celebrates the birth of high-tech septuplets that require a fortune in publiclysupported hospital care.7
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the race and class dimensions
of reproduction, a chief way of creating families, are clear. My prior writing
on the stratification of reproduction contrasted policies that penalize the
childbearing of poor nonwhite women with policies that promote childbearing
by wealthier white women.8 I take a different tack in this article. Rather than
place these two categories of women in opposition, I explore how the
privatization and punishment of reproduction links them together to avoid
public responsibility for social inequities. Both population control programs
and genetic selection technologies reinforce biological explanations for social
problems and place reproductive duties on women that shift responsibility for
improving social conditions away from the state. Reproductive health policies
involving both categories of women play an important role in the neo-liberal
state’s transfer of services from the welfare state to the private realm of family
and market.

Institute of Research on Women and Gender International Conference: Reproductive Disruptions:
Childlessness, Adoption, and Other Reproductive Complexities (May 19–22, 2005), available at www.umich.
edu/~reprocon/Serour Absrtract.doc; Johns Hopkins University Genetics and Public Policy Center Conference,
Custom Kids: The Genetic Testing of Embryos (Jan. 8, 2004) (meeting summary available at GENETICS &
PUB. POL’Y CTR., GENETIC TESTING OF HUMAN EMBRYOS PROVOKES LIVELY DISCUSSION, http://www.dnapoli
cy.org/tools-content/pdfs/2/62712.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2005)).
5 Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 85–86 (2001).
6 Frans M. Helmerhorst et al., Perinatal Outcome of Singletons and Twins after Assisted Conception: A
Systematic Review of Controlled Studies, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 261, 262–63 (2004), available at
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/328/7434/261; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to
Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (2004).
7 See LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 55 (1999) (noting that the McCaughey septuplets “required forty health care professionals,
divided into seven teams, at an estimated cost of up to $1 million”); id. at 61 (noting that the McCaugheys
received numerous expensive gifts, including a six thousand square foot house built with private donations, a
Toyota minivan, and a lifetime supply of Pampers); Tucker McQueen, Party of Five: Parents of Quintuplets
Give Support, Friendship to Couple about to Experience Similar Difficulties—and Joys, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Nov. 1, 2004, at 1E.
8 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY (1997).
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Viewing new reproductive technologies as a form of private regulation of
women’s childbearing decisions complicates the choice-versus-regulation
dichotomy that typically frames discussions of these technologies’ costs and
benefits. Technologies that enable women to have children and to select those
children’s genetic traits are often viewed as entirely freedom-enhancing tools
that should therefore be free from state regulation. I argue, however, that like
the reproductive regulations imposed on less privileged women, use of these
technologies has the potential to restrict women’s control over reproduction
while reinforcing social hierarchies that disadvantage women. Thus, it is
possible that some state regulation of the technologies will promote rather than
hamper women’s reproductive freedom. More importantly, recognizing the
restrictive potential of reprogenetics supports greater state investment in
eliminating the systemic inequities that make these technologies seem so
attractive for addressing disability and illness. Rather than expand public
surveillance and regulation of women’s reproductive decisions, we should
tackle the social conditions that limit women’s options for bearing and raising
healthy children who can flourish in this society.
A. Punishing Reproduction, Privatization, and Social Inequality
The turn of the twenty-first century has ushered in an explosion of rhetoric
and policies seeking to punish and regulate poor and minority women’s
reproductive decisions. Poor black women are especially vulnerable to
proposals that punish childbearing. The view of black women as irresponsible
reproducers is deeply embedded in the dominant American culture and
reinforced by a disparaging mythology about black mothers.9 Negative icons
of black maternity have included the sexually licentious Jezebel that
legitimated white slave masters’ sexual exploitation of their female slaves; the
asexual Mammy who, although she cared for her masters’ children, remained
under the supervision of her white mistress; the emasculating Matriarch held
responsible for the disintegration of the black family; and the sexually
irresponsible Welfare Queen who bred children just to fatten her welfare check
and then wasted the money recklessly on herself.10

9

See PATRICIA MORTON, DISFIGURED IMAGES: THE HISTORICAL ASSAULT ON AFRO-AMERICAN WOMEN
1–13, 125–33 (1991); ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 10–21.
10 See generally, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2000) (discussing negative stereotypes about black
mothers); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1999)
(describing the Jezebel and Mammy figures as chief representations of black enslaved women).
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The most recent addition to this maternal mythology is the pregnant crack
addict who is supposed to lack any maternal instinct. Newspaper articles portray
pregnant black women addicted to crack cocaine as careless and selfish women
who put their love for crack above their concern for their children.11 Reinforcing
the link between black female sexual licentiousness and maternal
irresponsibility, reporters often represent them as prostitutes who become
pregnant after trading sex for crack.12 Unlike any other drug, the chemical
properties of crack cocaine are said to destroy the natural impulse to mother.13
These women’s children are also the subject of gross racial stereotyping. Some
reporters claim that so-called “crack babies” not only suffer physical and
emotional damage, but are also more likely to become social pariahs.14 Noting
the failure of medical research to substantiate any such condition, syndrome, or
disorder, a group of researchers wrote that “‘Crack baby’ is not a medical
diagnosis but a media stereotype.”15
These stereotypes of black female sexual and reproductive irresponsibility
support welfare reform and law enforcement policies that severely regulate poor
black women’s sexual and child bearing decisions.16 Judges and legislators view
poor black women as suitable subjects for harsh reproductive penalties because
mainstream society does not view them as suitable mothers in the first place.17
The rush to punish poor, substance-abusing mothers for their reproductive
failures can be compared with the more temperate regulation of pregnant middleclass women who use risky pharmaceuticals to treat their mental health
problems. For example, I was struck by the sympathy shown to mothers in a
recent radio program discussing the dilemma of pregnant women who take
Prozac and other SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors), which have
not been approved by the FDA for use during pregnancy because there is
11

See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 153–59 (citing articles); ASSATA ZERAI & RAE BANKS,
DEHUMANIZING DISCOURSE, ANTI-DRUG LAW, AND POLICY IN AMERICA: A CRACK MOTHER’S NIGHTMARE 53
(2002).
12 ZERAI & BANKS, supra note 11, at 53.
13 See, e.g., Cathy Trost, Born to Lose: Babies of Crack Users Crowd Hospitals, Break Everybody’s
Heart, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1989, at A1 (quoting a nurse as stating that “most remarkable and hideous aspect
of crack cocaine use seems to be the undermining of the maternal instinct”); see also ZERAI & BANKS, supra
note 11, at 50–57 (discussing newspaper articles that supported a “crusade against crack mothers” from 1988
to 1990).
14 See, e.g., Rich Connell, The Hidden Devastation of Crack, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at A1.
15 Deborah A. Frank et al., Letter to the Editor, “Crack Baby” Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at
A42.
16 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 159–62; ZERAI & BANKS, supra note 11, at 142–43.
17 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 159–67.
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evidence they may cause subtle neurological problems in newborns.18 A
psychiatrist interviewed for the program explained that she tries to put the FDA
warning in context: “Ultimately, when you are face-to-face with a woman
struggling with depression or anxiety during or after her pregnancy, her
experience of illness is, I think, the most important determinant of the right thing
to do.”19 This attention to the depressed mother’s perspective contrasts starkly
with the typical disregard of the needs and humanity of poor black women who
self-medicate with crack cocaine.
By identifying procreation as the cause of deplorable social conditions,
reproductive punishments divert attention away from the need for social
change. Black mothers’ crack use, for example, became a primary explanation
for high rates of black infant mortality, a trend long predating the crack
epidemic.20 A recent exchange in the editorial pages of the New York Times
iterated the tension between attributing worsening rates of infant death to the
deficiencies of the U.S. health care system and to maternal substance abuse.
Columnist Nicholas D. Kristof wrote that in 2002 the already abysmal infant
mortality rate rose in this country to seven deaths for each thousand live births,
placing the United States behind forty-one other countries, including Cuba.21
Kristof noted that by slashing entitlements, especially those giving children
access to health care, the government is likely to exacerbate poor maternal and
infant health.22
In direct response to Kristof’s article, Barry S. Levy, an adjunct professor
at Tufts Medical School and a past president of the American Public Health
Association, endorsed Kristof’s diagnosis: “America’s world ranking of 42nd
in infant mortality, like the obesity and smoking epidemics and the recent
shortage of flu vaccine, reflects the overall decline in government support for
public health.”23 But Betsy McCaughey, an adjunct senior fellow at the
Hudson Institute, disagreed with Kristof’s focus on “the shortcomings of our
health system,” arguing instead that “the high infant mortality rate reflects a

18 Suffering for Two: The Bind of Maternal Depression (American Radioworks radio broadcast Aug.
2004), available at http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/maternaldepression/transcript.html.
19 Id.
20 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 154–59.
21 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Health Care? Ask Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A21.
22 Id.
23 Barry S. Levy, Letter to the Editor, Why are Infants at Risk in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at
A22.

ROBERTS GALLEYSFINAL

1348

11/29/2005 2:08 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

society where young girls and women take drugs while pregnant and give birth
to low-weight, drug addicted infants.”24
Neither Kristof nor his respondents mentioned the contribution of
reproduction-assisting technologies to the rising rate of infant deaths. The
numbers of babies born with low birth weight has increased in recent years in
part because of high risk multiple births to women who implant several
embryos created with high-tech procedures.25 Affluent women who decide to
take the risk of bearing unhealthy babies have not suffered the official
sanctions or public vilification directed to poor women with substance abuse
problems who often take steps to minimize any harm to their babies.26
This diversion of attention from social causes and solutions reinforces
privatization, the hallmark of the neo-liberal state that pervades every aspect of
public policy. In the wake of globalization, industrialized and developing
states have sought to reduce the financial burden of social welfare programs
while promoting the free market conditions conducive to capital
accumulation.27 Observing this phenomenon, Canadian legal scholar Roxanne
Mykitiuk writes that “the public sphere embraces as its governing logic market
rationales and practices.”28 Critical to this process of state restructuring is the
24 Betsy McCaughey, Letter to the Editor, Why are Infants at Risk in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2005, at A22.
25 See Marian F. MacDorman et al., Explaining the 2001–2002 Infant Mortality Increase: Data from the
Linked Birth/Infant Death Data Set, 53 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 5 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_12.pdf (“Increases in the number and percentage of multiple births over the past
two decades have contributed to increases in the percentage of preterm and low birthweight births,” and
account for twenty-five percent of the increase in infant mortality between 2001 and 2002); see also Seth
Borenstein, U.S. Infant Mortality Rate Increases: Cause Attributed to Older Mothers Giving Birth, Multiple
Births, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 2004, at 10A; Rob Stein, U.S. Infant Mortality Rate Rises 3%: First
Increase Since ‘58 Surprises Officials as Other Health Indicators Keep Improving, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
2004, at A11.
26 See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191–92 (discussing Jennifer Johnson’s efforts to get treatment for
her crack cocaine addiction while pregnant); see also Margaret H. Kearney et al., Mothering on Crack
Cocaine: A Grounded Theory Analysis, 38 SOC. SCI. & MED. 351, 355 (1994) (describing “defensive
compensation” by substance abusing mothers to protect their children from the negative effects of the mothers’
drug use). My point is not to judge the culpability of either group of women, but to highlight and contest the
disparities in societal and state judgments about their reproductive decisions.
27 See generally DAG MACLEOD, DOWNSIZING THE STATE: PRIVATIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF
NEOLIBERAL REFORM IN MEXICO (2004); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as
Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001);
Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare
State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003).
28 Roxanne Mykitiuk, The New Genetics in the Post-Keynesian State, in THE WORKING GROUP ON
WOMEN, HEALTH AND THE NEW GENETICS, THE GENDER OF GENETIC FUTURES 106, 107 (Fiona Miller et al.
eds., 2000), http://www.cwhn.cn/groups/biotech/availdocs/full-doc-2.pdf.
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transfer of services from the welfare state to the private realm of the market
and family.29 At the same time, the state deliberately transforms its institutions
to advance private sector interests in the market economy.
In his second term, President George W. Bush’s domestic agenda explicitly
revolved around promoting these neo-liberal values.
He called for
privatization of programs traditionally provided by government as the means
of establishing an “ownership society” in the United States that would replace
the prevailing New Deal approach.30 The Cato Institute, a libertarian think
tank that champions the ownership society, describes the concept as follows:
An ownership society values responsibility, liberty and property.
Individuals are empowered by freeing them from dependence on
government handouts and making them owners instead, in control of
their own lives and destinies. In the ownership society, patients
control their own health care, parents control their own children’s
31
education, and workers control their retirement savings.

President Bush’s most controversial step in creating an ownership society is
the restructuring of Social Security to allow younger workers to divert a
portion of their social security taxes into private accounts that could be
invested in stocks and bonds.32 President Bush’s plans for an ownership
society also include eliminating tax laws that penalize wealth accumulation
and transfer, and changing class action laws to shield corporations from large
tort damages awards.33
The ownership society and the privatization
philosophy it reflects demand that individuals rely on their own wealth to meet
their needs and discourage government aid for poor mothers who face systemic
hardships in caring for their children.
At the same time that the government has reduced support for families,
there has been a parallel increase in state intervention in poor women’s lives.
29

Id.
Jill Lawrence, Some Ask Who Belongs in ‘Ownership Society,’ USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2005, at 4A;
Eduardo Porter, When It Comes to Managing Retirement, Many People Simply Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2005, at C3.
31 David Boaz, Cato Inst., Defining an Ownership Society (2003), http://www.cato.org/special/owner
ship_society/boaz.html; see Adam Werbach, A Dangerous Legacy: Bush’s “Ownership Society” Champions a
Hyper-Individualism that Threatens the Commons, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 37, available at
www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1408.
32 See Judy Keen, Bush’s Choice of Words Is Telling, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2005, at 6A.
33 See, e.g., Janet Hook, Off to a Running Start, How Far Can GOP Go?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at
A1; James Hoopes, Don’t Draw Line at Dividends, End Wage Tax Too, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2003, at F4
(discussing double taxing of dividends).
30
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Over the last two decades, the welfare system, prison system, and foster care
system have clamped down on poor minority communities, especially innercity black neighborhoods, thereby increasing many families’ experience of
insecurity and surveillance.34 Welfare is no longer a system of aid, but rather a
system of behavior modification that attempts to regulate the sexual, marital,
and childbearing decisions of poor unmarried mothers by placing conditions on
the receipt of state assistance. The federal government encourages states to
implement financial incentives that deter welfare recipients from having
children and pressure them to get married.35
The contraction of the U.S. welfare state, culminating in the 1996 federal
welfare reform legislation,36 paralleled the expansion of prisons that
stigmatizes inner-city communities and isolates them further from the
privileges of mainstream society. Radical changes in crime control and
sentencing policies led to an unprecedented buildup of the U.S. prison
population over the last thirty years. By the end of 2002, the number of
inmates in the nation’s jails and prisons exceeded two million.37 Today’s
imprisonment rate is five times as high as in 1972 and surpasses that of all
other nations.38 The sheer scale and acceleration of U.S. prison growth has no
parallel in western societies.39 African Americans experience a uniquely
astronomical rate of imprisonment, and the social effects of imprisonment are
concentrated in their communities.40
Mounting social science studies on the community-level impact of mass
incarceration reveal that prison has become a systemic aspect of community
members’ family affairs, economic prospects, political engagement, social
34

See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 601
(2000); PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL’Y, A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE MARRIAGE-RELATED
PROVISIONS IN WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION BILLS PASSED BY THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND THE
HOUSE HUMAN RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE (2005), http://www.clasp.org/publications/sbs_marriage_060805.
pdf; Mink, supra note 5; Legal Momentum, Welfare and Poverty: State Marriage Initiatives, http://www.legal
momentum.org/issues/wel/marriagefamily.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2005).
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 601.
37 Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Prison Population Rises 2.6
Percent During 2002 (July 27, 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/p02pr.htm (“The country’s
prisons, jails and juvenile facilities held 2,166,260 persons at the end of last year . . . .”).
38 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN POPULATION CONTINUES 1
(2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf; David Garland, Introduction: The
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (David
Garland ed., 2001).
39 Garland, supra note 38, at 1.
40 See id. at 1–2 (describing the defining features of mass imprisonment).
35
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norms, and childhood expectations for the future.41 This social dynamic
aggravates and augments the negative consequences to individual inmates
when they come from and return to particular neighborhoods in concentrated
numbers. Prisons break down social networks and norms needed for political
solidarity and activism.42 Mass incarceration also destroys social citizenship at
the community level through felon disenfranchisement laws that dilute
neighborhood voting strength, through labor market exclusion, and by marking
entire communities as criminal and undeserving of public resources.43
The racial disparity in the child welfare system mirrors that of the prison
system.44 Because child welfare policy relies heavily on the punitive removal
of children from their homes, the largest group of the children awaiting
adoption in the nation’s public child welfare agencies is African-American.45
One year after Congress passed the welfare reform law, it enacted the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).46 ASFA amended federal
child welfare policy by prioritizing protection of children over the support of
families and by promoting adoption as a means to fix the overloaded foster
care system.47 As Mark Courtney notes, this marks the first time in U.S.
history that states have a federal mandate to protect children from abuse and
neglect but no corresponding mandate to provide basic economic support to
poor families.48 Like welfare reform, ASFA looks to a private remedy—in this
case, adoption—rather than curtailing the flow of poor, minority children into
foster care by providing needed resources to their families. Not only is there no
guarantee that all the children awaiting adoption will be placed in adoptive
homes, but adoption does nothing to address the needs of poor families who
are most at risk of involvement in the child welfare system.49

41 See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551 (2003) (discussing various studies).
42 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–1304 (2004).
43 Id. at 1281–97.
44 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 206 (2002).
45 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS (ADOPTION AND
FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM) REPORT: INTERIM FY 2000 ESTIMATES AS OF AUGUST 2002
(7), at 2–3, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report7.pdf.
46 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 173.
48 Mark E. Courtney, The Costs of Child Protection in the Context of Welfare Reform, 8 FUTURE
CHILDREN 88, 101 (1998).
49 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 149–72.
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At times, policy regimes have emphasized the social causes of marginality
and attempted to use welfare and prisons to reform and integrate socially
dispossessed groups.50 Exclusionary regimes, such as the one we are
witnessing in the United States today, paint marginalized people as
undeserving and unreformable deviants to be separated from the rest of
society; this is reflected in stingy public assistance and punitive anticrime
policies.51
There is a correlation between punishment and privatization. The decrease
in state responsibility for addressing poverty and social inequality has
accompanied an increase in state intervention in the lives of poor- and lowincome mothers, especially women of color. In other words, economic
insecurity is increasing among the most disadvantaged communities not only
because of state inaction, but also because of policies that affirmatively sustain,
replicate, and intensify systemic political and economic subordination. And
these two trends are mutually reinforcing.
Private remedies for systemic inequality and punitive state regulation of the
most disadvantaged communities are two sides of the same coin. Deliberate
state policies and practices work affirmatively to increase economic insecurity
of these communities while obscuring the state’s responsibility for causing it or
government’s obligation to address it. Attributing social inequities to the
childbearing of poor minority women and then using this attribution to justify
the regulation of reproduction is a critical component of this punitive trend
away from state support for families and communities.
B. Reproductive Genetics, Privatization, and Social Inequality
At the other end of reproductive caste system, new genetic technologies
have generated greater surveillance of women, the ones primarily responsible
for making the “right” genetic decisions. For decades, prenatal testing has
provided the capacity to avoid bearing children with genetic disorders.
Advances in reproduction-assisting technologies that create embryos in a
50 Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, in MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 38, at 35, 35–36; see, e.g., DAVID
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY (1990); GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO
KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Russell & Russell 1968) (1939).
51 See Beckett & Western, supra note 50, at 36. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathon Simon,
The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449
(1992) (discussing how an actuarial aggregation approach to the criminology is replacing traditional
concentrations on the individual).
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laboratory have converged with advances in genetic testing to produce
increasingly sophisticated methods to select for preferred genetic traits.
Reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization assist couples to have
children who not only are genetically related to them but who are genetically
advantaged. With preimplantation genetic diagnosis clinicians can diagnose
early embryos for their chance of having over four hundred genetic conditions
and implant only the ones that probably do not have these conditions. Sperm
sorting allows couples to select the sex of their children with eighty-five
percent accuracy.52 Some scientists predict that reproductive cloning and
genetic engineering—actually enhancing the embryo’s genetic makeup—will
be developed in the near future.53 These cutting edge procedures that enable
selection of embryos for their genetic traits are part of a new kind of
reproduction-assisting science called “reprogenetics.”54
It is important to distinguish between the ways in which genetic testing is
actually implemented. On the one hand, mass carrier screening programs,
especially those mandated by the government and aimed at reducing the
incidence of a disease in a population, have led to widespread discrimination
and coercion.55 On the other hand, providing nondirective genetic counseling
with informed consent to individuals who request it is unlikely to exploit
women and members of minority groups. Yet genetic screening programs,
even if they are supposed to be voluntary, create the expectation that women
will act on the results. Communities can put pressure on parents, especially
mothers, to produce perfect babies for the sake of the whole.
Ashkenazi Jews in the United States have developed perhaps the most
sophisticated defense and successful implementation of a community-based
program of genetic screening, largely responsible for a ninety percent
reduction in the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease from 1970 to 1993.56 An
authority on Jewish medical ethics defends the program as a “legitimate
52 Erik Parens & Lori P. Knowles, Reprogenetics and Public Policy: Reflections and Recommendations,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jul.–Aug. 2003, at S4 (special supp.).
53 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 237–39; GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNING HUMANS: OUR INEVITABLE
GENETIC FUTURE 1–2 (2002) (predicting that within a decade cloning and human genetic modification “will be
the cutting edge of human biological change”).
54 Parens & Knowles, supra note 52, at S4. The authors define reprogenetics, broadly, as “the field of
research and application that involves the creation, use, manipulation, or storage of gametes or embryos.” Id.
55 See generally TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (1990).
56 See generally Michael Kaback et al., Tay-Sachs Disease: Carrier Screening, Prenatal Diagnosis, and
the Molecular Era: An International Perspective 1970–1993, 270 JAMA 2307 (1993); Christine Rosen,
Eugenics—Sacred and Profane, NEW ATLANTIS, Summer 2003, at 79, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.
com/archive/2/rosen.htm.
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implementation of the biblical mandate to heal.”57 Premarital genetic testing
for Tay-Sachs has become the standard of care in some Orthodox Jewish
communities where marriages are arranged.58 “It’s now a duty, not a choice,”
says legal scholar Karen Rothenberg.59
More generally, it is increasingly routine for pregnant woman to get
prenatal diagnoses for certain genetic conditions such as Down syndrome or
dwarfism.60 Many obstetricians provide these tests without much explanation
or deliberation because they consider these screenings to be a normal part of
treating their pregnant patients. The director of reproductive genetics at a large
Detroit hospital reported that at least half of the women referred there with an
abnormal amniocentesis result were “uncertain about why they even had the
test.”61 A genetic counselor similarly notes, “Patients will come in and say, ‘I
am having the amniocentesis because my doctor told me to,’ but really in their
hearts they are not so sure that’s right for them. Some people are relieved to
find that they have a choice about having the test.”62 Still, many pregnant
women now view genetic testing as a requirement of responsible mothering.
I experienced this type of shallow ethical evaluation of prenatal testing in
2000 when I was pregnant with my fourth child at age forty-four. My
obstetrician recommended that I participate in a clinical trial by Northwestern
University Medical School researchers investigating the potential for
ultrasound to help detect genetic anomalies in the first trimester of
pregnancy.63 “It’s a way to get a free ultrasound,” he told me. Although the
researchers had an ethical obligation to reveal any significant risks entailed in
the procedure, neither they nor my obstetrician discussed with me the decision
I would have to make if the test results predicted that the fetus I was carrying
had a high risk of Down syndrome.64 Instead, everyone seemed to assume that

57

Rosen, supra note 56, at 81.
Charles M. Strom, Population-Based Carrier Screening and Prenatal Diagnosis, 36 MED. LIBR.
OBSERVER 12, 12 (2004), available at http://www.mlo-online.com/ce/pdfs/aug04.pdf.
59 Rosen, supra note 56, at 87.
See generally WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE
CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY (Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth Jean Thompson eds., 1994).
60 See Carol Smith, Q-and-A on Genetic Testing, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 2, 2004, at B3.
61 The Telltale Gene, 55 CONSUMER REP. 483, 486 (1990).
62 LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 95 (1998).
63 See generally Ronald Wapner et al., First-Trimester Screening for Trisomies 21 and 18, 349 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1405 (2003) (describing the study).
64 It is likely that the consent form I was given stated the possible test outcomes and the risks and
benefits of my participation in the clinical trial.
58
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the information could only make me better off and that there was no need for
serious deliberation about what I would do with it.65
Like the punishment of minority women’s childbearing, reprogenetics is
linked to the elimination of the welfare state and support for private remedies
for illness and disease. Placing responsibility for ending health disparities on
individual reproductive decisions can reduce the sense of societal obligation to
address systemic inequities. Reliance on eradicating illness through genetics
can divert attention and resources away from the social causes of disability and
disease, as well as social norms that impair social participation by sick and
disabled people. Some disability rights activists argue that genetic testing may
privatize disability in the sense that availability of prenatal diagnosis for a
disorder may discourage government funding for research and social services
for people who have the disorder.66
Genetic biotechnologies also shift responsibility for addressing disease
from the government to the individual by suggesting that health disparities are
a result of genetic variation rather than inequitable social structures and access
to health care. The FDA recently approved BiDil, the first race-based drug, to
treat heart failure specifically in African Americans.67 One theory supporting
BiDil is that the reason for higher mortality rates among black heart patients
lies in genetic differences among the races, either in the reason for getting
heart disease or the reason for responding differently to various medications
for it.68 BiDil’s manufacturer discounts the importance of environmental
factors in explaining differences in black and white patients’ experience of
heart disease to market a technological cure based on an asserted genetic
difference.69 As law professor Jonathan Kahn has chronicled, the FDA’s initial
denial of approval to BiDil as a race-less drug led its creators to reconceptualize it as a drug for blacks, enabling them not only to obtain the
65 The Genetics and Public Policy Center at Johns Hopkins University recommends considerably greater
deliberation prior to prenatal genetic testing: “The decision to undergo prenatal diagnostic testing should be
carefully considered. The testing should usually be done in concert with a process of education and values
clarification.” GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR., PRENATAL GENETIC TESTING 5 (2003), available at http://toolscontent.labvelocity.com/pdfs/3/62763.pdf.
66 See LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS 101 (2001); see
also Amy Harmon, The Problem With an Almost-Perfect Genetic World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at 1
(Week in Review sec.)
67 Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at
C2; see Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic,” Law, Commerce, and the Production of Racial
Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2004).
68 Kahn, supra note 67, at 11.
69 Id.
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FDA’s blessing, but also raise venture capital, receive a lucrative patent, and
launch a successful marketing campaign.70
At the same time, the neo-liberal support for capital accumulation
increasingly pervades the biotechnology industry. The initiative approved by
California voters in November 2004, allocating $3 billion in tax-supported
bonds to the biotechnology industry for stem cell research, illustrates the
state’s promotion of private investment in genetic technologies.71 The statesupported biotechnology industry creates a market for its genetic testing and
selection products by making consumers feel obligated to use them to ensure
the genetic fitness of their children.72
Reprogenetics serves as a form of privatization that makes the individual
the site of governance through the self-regulation of genetic risk.73 As
Professor Mykitiuk writes, “Is there a sense in which the new genetic
technologies are being used, or are capable of being used, as a means of
literally creating the responsible, autonomous, citizen of neo-liberalism—that
citizen who makes no legitimate claims on the state but rather, who freely
exercises their capacity for choice and manages their own self care?”74 The
logic of reprogenetics could support the view that childhood illness and
disability is the fault of mothers for not making the right genetic choices.
Making the wrong genetic choices in turn disqualifies citizens from claiming
public support. These women are, in effect, punished for their reproductive
decision to have an ill or disabled child because they are denied the support
they need to raise their child. In her book exploring the public consequences
of private decisions about reproductive technologies, Lynda Beck Fenwick
asks readers to ask themselves, “Are you willing to pay higher taxes to cover
costs of government benefits for babies born with genetic defects, even when
the parents knew of the high likelihood or certainty such defects would
occur?”75 As a result, the proliferation and promotion of new genetic
technologies is inversely related to access to general health care.
Women bear the brunt of reprogenetics’ contribution to the neo-liberal
restructuring of health care. Genetic technology introduces a new gendered
70

Id. at 46.
See CAL. CONST. art. XXXV; CAL. PROP. 71, STEM CELL RESEARCH. FUNDING BONDS. INITIATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND STATUTE (2004).
72 See Mykitiuk, supra note 28, at 109–10.
73 Id. at 108.
74 Id.
75 FENWICK, supra note 62, at 113.
71
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division of reproductive labor and surveillance as women become “gatekeepers
of new social order.”76 Professor Mykitiuk points out that, contrary to the
deregulation that typically occurs in the service of big business, the new duties
imposed on women constitute a “re-regulation intended to make possible the
greater appropriation of intellectual property and its capitalization.”77
Reprogenetics also makes eugenic thinking seem more acceptable.
Sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman calls the marketing of prenatal diagnostic
technologies a form of “micro-eugenics,” eugenics focused on the individual
(in contrast to macro-eugenics’ focus on populations), that values or disvalues
specific characteristics believed to be inherited.78 Some disabilities rights
advocates object to preimplantation or fetal diagnoses that lead to discarding
embryos and fetuses predicted to have disabilities because they devalue people
who have these disabilities, implying that they should never have been born.79
The quality of many disabled people’s lives depends as much on social
acceptance, access, and accommodation as on their physical capacities. Apart
from avoiding certain fatal or severely disabling diseases, such as anencephaly
or Tay-Sachs disease, reprogenetics inscribes the perceived social advantage of
having or not having certain abilities or traits associated with genes. Selecting
children’s abilities or sex reflects the social advantages and disadvantages
connected to these categories and may reinforce an unjust value system that
privileges some over others. Unable to count on societal acceptance or support
for children with disabilities, however, many women feel compelled to turn to
genetic testing to ensure their children’s welfare.80
The role privileged women play in this integrated system of privatization
and punishment is obscured by liberal notions of reproductive choice. Despite
the potential for reprogenetics to diminish public health care and intensify
regulation of women’s reproductive decisions, its sponsors often defend the
76 Mykitiuk, supra note 28, at 112; see also Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening:
Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 39 (1991) (“[B]ecause a child’s
disability is viewed as a private problem for the family, the gendered attribution of responsibilities for family
health to women obligates them to deal with it alone whether by avoiding, reducing or managing disability.”).
77 Mykitiuk, supra note 28, at 112.
78 BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE BOOK OF LIFE: A PERSONAL AND ETHICAL GUIDE TO RACE,
NORMALITY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (2001). A husband who advertised in
the Yale Daily News for an attractive, athletic egg donor of Jewish descent with a minimum combined SAT
score of 1500 wrote to a potential donor that his wife was “‘a real Nazi’ about ‘donor looks and donor health
history.’” Jessica Cohen, Grade A: The Market for a Yale Woman’s Eggs, ATL. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 74,
75.
79 See FENWICK, supra note 62, at 90.
80 See Lippman, supra note 76, at 32.
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industry’s immunity from state regulation in the name of women’s
reproductive freedom. Marsha Tyson Darling of the Center for AfricanAmerican and Ethnic Studies at Adelphi University notes that “eugenic
advocates have undertaken to infuse eugenics imperatives into the women’s
reproductive rights movement.”81 They see women’s ability to select the traits
of their children, including sex and other qualities unrelated to health, as an
aspect of reproductive choice. Concerns about the implications for women, the
disabled, racial minorities, and other disadvantaged groups are dismissed as
threats to reproductive freedom.
As I argued above, however, creating duties to use reprogenetic
technologies in prescribed ways would limit women’s choices. Just as
important, the promotion of these technologies in the context of systemic
inequalities and inadequate support for caregiving steers women to make
reproductive decisions that reinforce social inequality. Thomas H. Murray
faults procreative liberty as the ethical framework for evaluating reproductive
technology for its “difficulty summoning the ethical will to curb the indulgence
of almost any parental whim.”82 One important ethical curb, on public policy
as well as parental decisions, that is elided by the singular focus on
reproductive choice is the social harm risked by eugenic thinking.
Indeed, some clients of reprogenetics have even claimed moral superiority
over women who have abortions for nonselective reasons. In a July 22, 2004,
op-ed piece in the New York Times, Barbara Ehrenreich called on women who
aborted fetuses based on prenatal diagnosis to support the general right to
abortion.83 She noted that these women sometimes distinguish themselves
from women who have “ordinary” abortions. One woman who aborted a fetus
with Down syndrome stated, “I don’t look at it as though I had an abortion,
even though that is technically what it is. There’s a difference. I wanted this
baby.”84 On a website for a support group called “A Heart Breaking Choice” a
mother who went to an abortion clinic complains, “I resented the fact that I had

81 Marsha J. Tyson Darling, Eugenics Unbound: Race, Gender, and Genetics, http://www.gjga.org/confe
rence.asp?action=item&source=documents&id=62; see also BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING
MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 116 (1989) (criticizing the
contemporary feminist reproductive rights movement for “making uneasy alliances with the new eugenics
movement which looks at embryos and fetuses as products suitable for quality-control testing”).
82 Thomas H. Murray, What Are Families For? Getting to an Ethics of Reproductive Technology,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2002, at 41, 45 (2002).
83 Barbara Ehrenreich, Op-Ed., Owning Up to Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at A21.
84 Id.
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to be there with all these girls that did not want their babies.”85 This perverse
moral distinction between ordinary and so-called “medical abortion” reinforces
the reproductive stratification that separates women whose childbearing is
punished from those whose childbearing is technologically promoted by
distinguishing even between the kinds of abortions they have.
This classification of abortions is reminiscent of the historical distinction
that states made between therapeutic or eugenic abortion and elective abortion.
When abortion was criminalized in the United States during the second half of
the nineteenth century, state laws made exceptions for cases in which
pregnancy or childbirth threatened a woman’s life or health.86 While abortions
based on women’s own decision not to have a child (“elective” abortions) were
illegal, abortions based on physicians’ judgments about the medical or social
ills of pregnancy (“therapeutic” or “eugenic” abortions) were approved.
Physicians’ proposals for legislative reform prior to Roe v. Wade centered on
the need for abortion to reduce either births of defective babies or births to
women with psychiatric disorders.87 As historian Johanna Schoen observes,
“the debates surrounding abortion focused on specific medical conditions that
might justify a therapeutic or eugenic abortion but remained hostile to elective
abortion, which could extend reproductive control to women.”88 The existence
of a physical or mental impairment was more critical to the medical
profession’s defense of abortion than enhancing women’s reproductive
freedom.
States classified abortions as eugenic, therapeutic, or elective as a means of
regulating women’s access to them and limiting the potential of abortion to
further women’s emancipation. A contemporary woman who valorizes
eugenic abortion while disparaging elective abortion resuscitates the nineteenth
century abortion hierarchy, a hierarchy that impedes women’s reproductive
self-determination. Barbara Katz Rothman distinguishes arguments for legal
abortion based on “fetal defect” from feminist prochoice claims because they
focus on the fetus and not on the woman.89 Because eugenic thinking can
pressure women to abort a fetus deemed to be genetically inferior, Marsha
85

Id.
JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL, STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN
PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 140 (2005).
87 Id. at 143.
88 Id. at 142.
89 See ROTHMAN, supra note 81, at 115–16; see also Lippman, supra note 76, at 34 (noting that “prenatal
diagnosis has (re)defined the grounds for abortion,” giving geneticists and obstetricians power over abortion
decisions).
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Saxton notes that the goal of the disability rights movement concerning
abortion is “the right not to have to have an abortion.”90 The incorporation of
eugenic values in arguments for women’s reproductive freedom neglects the
history of abortion regulation as well as the potential for reprogenetics to
impose restrictive expectations on women to serve as genetic screeners of
children.
CONCLUSION
The women at opposite ends of the reproductive hierarchy are part of an
interlocking system of privatization and punishment. Both the punishment of
marginalized women’s childbearing and the promotion of reprogenetics for
privileged women place reproductive duties on women that help to privatize
remedies for illness and social inequities. Instead of joining together to contest
the social forces that limit their reproductive freedom, including inadequate
health care and the gendered division of household labor, these women are
further separated by the exclusive genetic technology industry. Affluent
women’s access to high tech solutions to infertility, disability, and illness can
impede their motivation to pursue collective action against social inequities,
including their own subordinated position in relation to men. The most
privileged women’s increasing reliance on high-tech reproductive remedies for
socially-caused problems thus obscures the role they share with the most
disadvantaged women in the neo-liberal shift from social welfare to
privatization and capital accumulation. Both groups of women have an interest
in halting this shift and in advocating for greater public investment in
improving the social conditions that determine children’s welfare.

90 Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 374, 375 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).

